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relationship between legislation and case law is a highly important subject 
in the Korean Supreme Court’s jurisprudence.  Such relationship is 
relevant to statutory interpretation.  The outcome of statutory interpretation 
is usually contingent upon how the judges understand and construct statute, 
a creature of the legislative body.  Judges may differ in their approaches to 
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assessing the supremacy of statutory language or legislative will or whether 
to construe a statute contrary to its words in light of the overall purpose of 
that statue.  In other words, the outcome of a judicial case may depend on 
whether the judge is willing to defer to the legislature, to plug certain 
perceived loopholes in a statute, or even to attempt purposive interpretation 
seemingly contradicting the statutory language.  In this piece, I will review 
the roles and responsibilities of the Korean judiciary with a focus on the 
relationship between the legislature and courts.  Towards this end, I will 
first discuss the Korean Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on statutory 
interpretation.  Such introduction will be followed by a discussion on some 
of the key Court decisions on the relationship between the two branches of 
government. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
It gives me tremendous honor and joy to present a speech at 
this honorable conference.  Not unlike other free democratic states, 
the Republic of Korea is organized into three branches of the 
government.  While the administrative branch is headed by an elected 
president, the National Assembly represents the legislative branch 
and the courts embody the judicial branch.  This separation of powers 
prevents a concentration of public authority through a system of 
check and balance, while assuring the freedom and constitutional 
rights of the general public.  Against this constitutional backdrop, it 
is important to assess how the legislative and administrative branch 
affect the judiciary in each court case and vice versa. 
The precedents of courts have an important bearing on the 
process of legislation.  As court precedents build up, they crystallize 
into jurisprudence, which then may find inroads into legislation.  
Conversely, new pieces of legislation may be introduced to rectify 
what is perceptibly wrong with the judge-made law. 
Meanwhile, the relationship between legislation and case law 
is a highly important subject in the Korean Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence.  Such relationship, first and foremost, is relevant to 
statutory interpretation.  The outcome of statutory interpretation is 
usually contingent upon how the judges understand and construct 
statute, a creature of the legislative body.  Judges may differ in their 
approaches to assessing the supremacy of statutory language or 
legislative will, or whether to construe a statute contrary to its words 
in light of the overall purpose of that statute.  In other words, the 
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outcome of a judicial case may depend on whether the judge is willing 
to defer to the legislature or to plug certain perceived loopholes in a 
statute or even to attempt purposive interpretation seemingly 
contradicting statutory language.  Furthermore, judicial (in)activism 
remains an important subject of debate in the realm of judicial 
philosophy. 
In this piece, I will attempt to review the roles and 
responsibilities of the Korean judiciary with a focus on the 
relationship between the legislature and courts.  Towards this end, I 
will first discuss the Korean Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on 
statutory interpretation.  Such introduction will be followed by a 
discussion on some of the key Court decisions on the relationship 
between the two branches of government.  I then look forward to 
hearing from today’s participating luminaries. 
Ⅱ. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE LEGISLATURE AND 
JUDICIARY THROUGH THE PRISM OF STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION 
The courts’ primary role is to interpret and apply the law.  In 
relation to this function, different conclusions may be arrived at 
depending on how the relationship between the legislature and the 
judiciary is assessed. Such assessment entails a probe into germane 
Korean jurisprudence. Of particular interest here is how Korean 
courts have weighed statutory language against the element of 
legislative intent or purpose in the context of statutory interpretation.1 
 Statutory words provide a fertile starting point for statutory 
interpretation.2  As a matter of principle, the court’s role is to interpret a statute 
according to its text.  In carrying out such textual interpretation, it is important to 
ascertain a possible meaning of the underlying text (möglicher Wortsinn) as well 
as what meaning the text conveys in the overall context of the statute.  In the vast 
majority of relatively noncontroversial cases, the precedents of Korea are centered 
on textual or literary interpretation.3 
                                                                                                               
 1 This Part is a summary of Kim Jae Hyung (김재형), Hwang-geumdeulnyeok-ui 
Aleumdaum: Beobhaeseog-ui Han Danmyeon (법학평론) [Splendor of Autumn Fields of Gold: 
an Aspect of Legal Interpretation], 1 BEOBHAK PYOUNGRON [SNU L. REV.] 223–229 (2010). 
 2 As the expression “(t)he text . . . remains the alpha and omega of interpretation” 
demonstrates, the weight and importance of text are often emphasized in all types of 
interpretation including statutory interpretation. See Mary Ann Glendon, Comment, in A 
MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 106, 106 (Amy Gutmann eds., 1998). 
 3 See, e.g., Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 93Da52808, Aug. 12, 1994 (S. Kor.). 
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Interestingly, there are instances where, especially in the 
context of Supreme Court en banc judgments, dissenting justices 
criticized the majority as derogating from the usual rite of textual 
interpretation.  For instance, the dissenting opinion in 95Da3666 
noted that where the plain meaning of statutory language is 
unambiguous, attempting to otherwise widen or narrow such meaning 
is unwarranted unless there is a compelling need for purposive or 
teleological judicial interpretation of the same language. 4   The 
majority’s judgement in this case was considered by the dissenting 
opinion to be ultra vires and tantamount to re-legislating the statue at 
issue. 
Also, the dissenting opinion in 2004Su42 criticized the 
majority for having in effect arbitrarily altered what the minority 
viewed as the reasonably plain meaning of Article 120 of the Family 
Register Act.5  This opinion will be dealt with in more detail below.6  
Moreover, in 94Moe32, a case involving the Korean Criminal Code, 
the dissenting judges pointed out that what underpins judicial 
interpretation of the criminal law is textual interpretation; 
accordingly, interpreting the Criminal Code in a way that exceeds the 
possible plain meaning of the Code amounts to an act of newly 
creating or re-legislating the penal enactment. 7   These minority 
opinions point toward the flimsiness of boundaries between statutory 
interpretation and legislation. 
Yet in a case where textual interpretation is found wanting, 
the adjudicating court may go on to consider the intent of the 
legislature and the purpose of the statute being scrutinized.8  In fact, 
on many occasions, the Court took on statutory interpretation by 
considering not only the legal text, but also the legislative intent and 
purpose of the enactment involved. 9   For instance, the minority 
                                                                                                               
 4 Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 95Da36466, Apr. 23, 1998 (S. Kor.). 
 5 Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2004Su42, June 22, 2006 (S. Kor.). 
 6 See infra Part III.B. 
 7 Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 94Moe32, Dec. 20, 1994 (S. Kor.). For an interesting debate on 
interpretation of the criminal law in the aftermath of this decision, see SHIN DONG WOON (신동운) ET 
AL., BEOBLYULHAESEOG-UI HANGYE (법률해석의 한계) [The Limits of Statutory Interpretation] 
(2000). 
 8 The legislative intent here refers to that which is revealed during the process of 
legislation. When it comes to statutory interpretation, the legislator’s subjective intent is not 
as important as in the context of interpreting contracts. See generally KARL LARENZ, 
METHODENLEHRE DER RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT [Methodology of Jurisprudence] 328 (6th ed. 
1991). 
 9 See e.g., Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 96Da54195, Apr. 22, 1997 (S. Kor.). 
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opinion in 2006Doe4549 noted that interpretation of a criminal 
statute involves a process of clarifying the normative meaning of the 
statute for its application to a specific set of facts.10 The process of 
interpretation starts from ascertaining the linguistic meaning and 
content of the statutory provision being probed (textual interpretation) 
while at the same time, interpreting with logical consistencies in light 
of other related enactments (logical interpretation).  Yet where 
following the text or underlying logic of a statute is insufficient to 
catch on the normative meaning of statutory language, the court 
should go on to consider, inter alia, legislative history, legislative 
intent and purpose, and function of the criminal provision in question 
(teleological interpretation).  Albeit a minority opinion, it gracefully 
illustrates the method of statutory interpretation consistently adopted 
by the Court. 
In cases where the text of a statute and its legislative intent or 
purpose collide, the question then becomes whether the court should 
prioritize the text itself or the intent or purpose meant by the 
legislature.  A corollary to this issue is when, if ever, the court may 
interpret a statute contrary to its text.  This has been the subject of 
ongoing scholarly and judicial debates for decades. 
To start off, textualism requires a judge to duly adhere to the 
statutory text, and there is virtually no exception to this school of 
statutory construction.  For instance, the late justice Scalia, a 
renowned textualist, asserted that a statute must be interpreted 
according to its text as there is no realistic means of fathoming the 
legislative intent behind it.11  Textualism is apparently at odds with 
intentionalism or purposivism.  Under these theories, a statute is 
constructed in light of its legislative intent or statutory purpose, as the 
case may be. 12   Under either theory, statutory interpretation that 
exceeds or contradicts the statutory text may be contemplated.  
Ronald Dworkin asserted that hard cases or “those cases in which the 
result is not clearly dictated by statute or precedent”13 should be tried 
according to the principle of law.14  He further espoused constructive 
                                                                                                               
 10 Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2006Doe4549, Nov. 16, 2006 (S. Kor.). 
 11 ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 23–25 (Amy Gutmann eds., 1998). 
 12 For a discussion on intentionalism and purposivism in the American context, see 
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. ET AL., LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION (2006). See 
also KENT GREENAWALT, LEGISLATION STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: 20 QUESTIONS (1999). 
 13 Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARVARD L. REV. 1057 (1975). 
 14 RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 84 (1977). 
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interpretation as a mode of statutory interpretation.15  This model of 
interpretation permits the best possible interpretation of a statute by 
considering related principles of law at the time of construction, 
which in turn leaves “headroom” for a mode of statutory 
interpretation that seemingly contradicts the legal text. 
In Korea, there is a theory of law that statutory interpretation 
should generally proceed in the order of statutory text, legislative 
intent and statutory purpose.16  Yet determining if the legislative 
intent should precede the statutory purpose or vice versa in a given 
court case is far from easy.  Codified law is expressed in words.  The 
legislature’s intent is reflected through the text of a statute, and such 
intent may not include what is on the subjective mind of responsible 
legislators.  Granted, there may be cases where, due to linguistic 
barriers, ascertaining the meaning of statutory text is not feasible 
without knowing the legislative intent behind it.  Considering the 
intent of the legislative body in such a case may be a commendable 
step towards understanding the meaning of the text.  However, 
instructing the general public to self-study the subjective intent or 
opinion of the lawmaker, which may not be readily discernable from 
a plain reading of the text itself, and to act based on such self-
knowledge, is akin to a recipe for disaster.  Moreover, the purpose of 
a statute plays an important role in statutory interpretation.  More 
often than not, skilled statutory interpretation is unattainable without 
probing the purpose of statute.  In fact, interpreting the meaning of a 
statute by examining its legal raison d’être is fairly commonplace.  
Even where a court case refers to some legislative intent, such 
reference is usually directed to the objective purpose of the statute 
before the court, rather than any state of mind on the part of the 
lawmaker.  Accordingly, statutory interpretation starts with the text; 
as an exception to this practice, there may be cases where the 
legislative intent or purpose may be considered as deemed 
appropriate. 
In the meanwhile, it may be necessary to distinguish praeter legem 
from contra legem.  The technique of praeter legem or statutory 
interpretation beyond the text is put to use where there is a legal lacuna 
or defect in a legislation, to make up for such an inherent gap or flaw.  
                                                                                                               
 15 RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 55 (1986). See also ANDREI MARMOR, 
INTERPRETATION AND LEGAL THEORY 36 (1992). 
 16 See SHIM HUN SUB (심헌섭), BUNSEOGGWA BIPAN-UI BEOBCHULHAG (분석과 비판의 
법철학) [Legal Philosophy of Analysis and Criticism] 217 (2001). 
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It is exemplified by analogy or analogical interpretation.  By contrast, 
contra legem refers to a method of statutory interpretation that contradicts 
the literal meaning of the statutory text.  As one can conjecture, while 
praeter legem is exercised relatively frequently, contra legem is attempted 
and acknowledged only in limited circumstances. 
The Korean Court has held that praeter legem may be envisaged 
where textual or logical interpretation of the civil law alone is 
insufficient to resolve a real-life dispute.17  In such a case, analogical 
statutory interpretation may be employed instead to resolve the 
dispute in conformity with the notion of social justice and to 
eventually arrive at an equitable outcome.  There is also a decision 
recognizing the possibility of contra legem where textual interpretation 
of a statute would have led to a rather unconscionable result.18  In this 
regard, the Court noted in another case that where a piece of 
legislation fails to keep up with social changes, the court’s role is not 
merely to ask the legislature to revise or update the law and then wait 
for ensuing legislative follow-ups, but to try out a reasonably 
innovative method of statutory application to avoid an absurd 
outcome that could  have arisen from customary, textual construction 
of the black letter law.19  Needless to say, any attempt at contra legem 
should be considered a rare exception, rather than the prevailing norm. 
Where textual interpretation of a statute is likely to generate 
an outcome that flies in the face of the Constitution, the court may 
consider and adopt constitutionally compliant statutory interpretation, 
even though it may belie the statutory text.20  The court may also 
attempt contra legem using the basic principles of law.  Yet caution 
should be taken here regarding routine acts of interpretation beyond 
the legal text simply because rationality or morality dictates so under 
the circumstances.  Otherwise, the law may well lose its reason for 
being.  Whether the law should consider any fabric of morality or 
reason and, if so, what should be considered moral or reasonable 
under a particular enactment, is better left to the legislature.  The 
                                                                                                               
 17 Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 93Da52808, Aug. 12, 1994 (S. Kor.). 
 18 Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 98Da9038, Dec. 10, 1999 (S. Kor.). 
 19 Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 95Da36466, Apr. 23, 1998 (S. Kor.). 
 20 In Korea, aside from the Supreme Court, which is the highest level of court, there is 
a separate constitutional court. HUNBEOB [CONSTITUTION] art. 101.2 (S. Kor.). The Korean 
Constitutional Court is empowered to review the constitutionality of various legislations. 
HUNBEOB [CONSTITUTION] art. 111.1 (S. Kor.). The Court is not empowered to determine the 
constitutionality of court judgements, which largely distinguishes the Korean constitutional 
court system from the German counterpart. 
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lawmaker’s will or resolve may well be denigrated if a court were to 
hand down a decision squarely refuting the statutory text before it 
based on the court’s own moral compass.21  Any attempt at justifying 
contra legem on the basis of morality or rationality, therefore, should 
be taken with a grain of salt. 
Ⅲ. RELATIONS BETWEEN THE LEGISLATURE AND JUDICIARY 
AS REFLECTED IN THE KEY COURT JUDGEMENTS 
A. Objective of Statutory Interpretation: A Balance between 
Legal Certainty and Case-specific Correctness 
The Supreme Court decision of 2006Da81035 is about the 
meaning of tenant under the Rental Housing Act of Korea (“RHA”).22  
In this case, the Court addressed what forms the primary objective of 
statutory interpretation and related standards of interpretation.  The 
plaintiff in this case, the Korea National Housing Corporation, leased 
an apartment to defendant A under the RHA.  The rental contract was 
signed off by defendant A under her own name.  In fact, however, 
defendant B, defendant A’s father, had asked his daughter to enter 
into the rental contract on his behalf.  The security deposit came from 
defendant B, and the actual tenant of the leased apartment was also 
defendant B, not his daughter. 
Under the RHA, after five years of a mandatory lease period, 
a tenant is entitled to purchase the rental property on a priority basis, 
provided the tenant is not the owner of another house or apartment 
from the onset of tenancy until the time of purchase.  At the end of 
the lease, however, since defendant 1 already owned another house, 
she was not entitled to such priority purchase.  And neither was 
defendant 2 entitled as he was not party to the original lease contract, 
and therefore not an eligible tenant.  Following the expiry of the rental 
contract, the plaintiff sued both defendants for eviction and 
repossession of property. 
In relation to who is a tenant under the RHA, the appellate 
court and the Supreme Court reached polar opposite conclusions.  
This difference in outcome may be attributed to dissonant judicial 
views on the nature of relationship between the judiciary and the 
                                                                                                               
 21 This does not mean that the meaning of statutory text ought to be interpreted 
according to the legislator’s intent. 
 22 Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2006Da81035, Apr. 23, 2009 (S. Kor.). 
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legislature.  The appellate court rejected the plaintiff’s request for an 
eviction order in the middle of a freezing winter, which then received 
media coverage as a “heartwarming decision of a beautiful judicial 
mind”. 23  The appellate court noted that, considering the policy 
objectives of the RHA, limiting the scope of tenant under the RCA to 
a tenant whose name and signature is on the lease would be a typical 
example of textual, formalistic statutory interpretation gone 
overboard.  Considering the extenuating circumstances of defendant 
2 here, the court considered him to be a tenant under the RHA for all 
intents and purposes.  As such, defendant 2 was entitled to a priority 
purchase right under the RHA, and the remedies sought by the 
plaintiff were accordingly denied. 
The Supreme Court, on the other hand, vacated the appellate 
court decision and remanded it.  In so doing, the highest court noted 
that since the law embodies universal norms binding affected 
members of the public without discrimination, a court’s legal 
interpretation should be a search for the objective meaning of the text 
involved and for legal certainty to ensure consistencies in 
interpretation.  At the same time, statutory interpretation should 
proceed in a way that aims to provide the most apt solution to a set of 
facts before the adjudicating court.  Accordingly, the Court held, the 
primary objective of statutory interpretation should be a pursuit of 
individual correctness within the overriding boundaries of legal 
certainty. 
In this process, textual interpretation that identifies and 
construes to the extent possible the ordinary meaning of the statutory 
text should be a guiding norm.  In addition, the legislative intent and 
purpose of the statute, its legislative chronology, and relationship to 
other pertinent enactments may be considered as part of a systematic 
and logical approach to statutory interpretation.  Especially where the 
text of a statute consists of relatively unambiguous notions and 
terminologies, the court should not hesitate to employ textual 
interpretation for resolution of the case at hand. 
In this case, the Court clarified that the aim of statutory 
interpretation is to achieve case-specific correctness without 
                                                                                                               
 23 For a detailed analysis of the appellate judgement, see Kim Jae Hyung, supra note 1, 
at 200. This publication was originally prepared as a research paper on the appellate case at the 
request of a Supreme Court research judge and submitted to the Court in 2008. The 
2006Da81035 Court subsequently followed the same line of reasoning as laid out in the paper, 
which got published in 2010. 
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undermining legal certainty.  Towards this end, textual interpretation 
should be considered a primary tool with possible consideration of 
other pertinent elements including the intent of the lawmaker.  In this 
case, the RHA was devoid of a specific interpretive provision on the 
meaning of tenant thereunder.  Accordingly, the Court took the liberty 
of construing the ordinary meaning of tenant according to how it is 
understood under the Civil Code24 as guided by general social norms.  
Under Article 618 of the Civil Code, a tenant denotes someone who 
has entered into a lease contract with the landlord.  Under this type of 
contract, the tenant is given a bundle of rights including the right to 
quiet enjoyment of the rental property in consideration of the tenant’s 
payment of rents.  A de facto user or beneficiary of the property or 
the actual payor of the initial deposit or rents, fails to qualify as a 
tenant.  This is what possibly prompted the Court to vacate the 
appellate decision. 
 
B. Judicial Response to Social Changes: Filling-in of Legislative 
Vacuums through Case Law 
Korea lacks express statutory provisions on how to implement 
the sex reassignment of a transgender person administratively.  Under 
Korea’s family registry system, a person’s gender is recorded at the 
time of birth.  When the same person undergoes a sex reassignment 
process later on, there is no administrative procedure to follow to 
modify the gender section on the family registry.  Despite this status 
quo, in a recent en banc judgment, the Court granted sex 
reassignment of a transgender so that entries on the family registry 
may be revised to match the reassigned gender. 
In the Korean Court decision of 2004Su42, the majority 
determined that sex reassignment of a transgender is feasible through 
statutory interpretation, while the dissenting judges opposed that 
determination.25  The concurring opinions supported the majority by 
espousing the notion of constitutional statutory interpretation.  This 
seminal case exemplifies divergent views among the Court justices 
on the relationship between the legislature and the courts. 
                                                                                                               
 24 Minbeob [Civil Code], Act No. 471, Feb. 22, 1958, amended by Act No. 14965, Oct. 
31, 2017 (S. Kor.). 
       25  Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2004Su42, June 22, 2006 (S. Kor.). 
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The applicant in this case was born a female in 1951 and 
registered so on her family registry.  While growing up, however, the 
applicant exhibited masculine temperament and physical traits.  In 
1992, the applicant underwent successful sex change surgeries to 
obtain male sex organs and received ongoing hormone treatments 
thereafter.  As a result, the applicant acquired masculine body traits 
as well as the firm gender identity of a man.  The court of first 
instance and the appellate court both rejected the applicant’s request 
to change the gender information on the family register citing a lack 
of statutory grounds to grant such a request.  The Korean Court, 
however, vacated and remanded the decision below. 
The Court noted that, judging by social norms, the applicant 
could be clearly evaluated a male.  This is because the applicant was 
an unmarried person with no child who had acquired male sex organs 
and physical features as a result of previous surgeries.  Also, 
considering the applicant’s strong gender identity as that of a man, 
which had built up over the course of adolescence and adulthood, 
there was little likelihood of the applicant reverting back to the 
original gender.  Moreover, the applicant was recognized as a male 
both in personal and social spheres. 
But when it came to whether the sex reassignment of a 
transgender is administratively possible, the justices were divided.  
The majority acknowledged such possibility in the affirmative.  They 
noted that Article 120 of the Family Register Act (currently Article 
104 of the Act on the Registration, etc. of Family Relationships) 
(“FRA”) provides for procedures to follow when correcting or 
modifying entries on the family register.  This provision, they held, 
is applicable when changing the gender of a genuine transgender on 
the Register to conform to the reassigned gender. 
In the majority’s view, a transgender is someone whose 
gender at birth is different from the legally evaluated gender at the 
time of applying for a correction to the family register.  Since, as 
members of the public, transgender persons have the right to pursue 
happiness and enjoy life as decent human beings, such request should 
be granted unless it is contrary to maintenance of the public order or 
welfare. 
The majority held that the purpose of Article 120 of the FRA 
is to enable an applicant to correct the family registry when certain 
registry entries are inappropriate or do not match the applicant’s 
current vital status.  In light of this legislative aim, when it is verified 
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that the applicant is a genuine transgender, it would be rational to 
permit the application to go through so that the family registry can 
duly reflect the applicant’s newly acquired gender. 
Two justices of the Court dissented.  In their opinion, the 
purpose of FRA Article 120 is to remedy what was erroneously 
recorded on the family register at the time of birth report due to a 
clerical mistake or an error.  Accordingly, if the family register 
truthfully matches an applicant’s vital status and related entries at the 
time of birth report, subsequent changes including any gender 
reassignment may not provide grounds for invoking FRA Article 120 
to correct the family register.  The statutory text of FRA Article 120 
is so unambiguous that any different construction is simply 
unwarranted.  The majority opinion was therefore criticized for going 
beyond the outer limits of legitimate analogical interpretation.  
According to the dissenting judges, the Court’s proper role was to 
acknowledge the absence of legal grounds to change the gender 
section of the family register in such a case as the present one and to 
urge the legislature to create a new enactment or to amend the FRA 
Article 120 regime in due time, to duly address the current 
controversy. 
The concurring opinion supported the majority along the line 
of constitutional statutory interpretation.  Namely, transsexual 
persons are exposed to a peculiar situation whereby their biological 
gender at birth does not match the gender they get to confirm while 
growing up and into adulthood.  Given this peculiarity, correcting a 
transsexual’s gender should be within the ambit of Article 120 of the 
FRA.  Of course, enacting a new legislation to provide for such 
correction process would be most ideal.  But in the absence of an 
existing legislative framework, the court should grant administrative 
correction of a qualified transsexual on a case-specific basis by 
recourse to constitutional statutory interpretation.  In this regard, 
leaving transsexuals forlorn without a viable remedy would be 
unconstitutional. 
This decision is a landmark.  2004Su42 put forward the 
following three pre-conditions to correct a transsexual’s gender. 26  
First, there must be a medical diagnosis of transsexualism the 
symptoms of which remain unalleviated and continue. 27  This should 
                                                                                                               
 26 Id. 
 27 Id. 
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be accompanied by the affected individual’s mental and social 
adjustive migration toward the opposite sex.  Second, there must be 
gender reassignment surgery to enable the patient to acquire the 
sexual characteristics of the opposite sex28.  Third, judging by general 
social norms, the transsexual must be seen as equipped with traits of 
the opposite gender, which then leads to normatively permissible 
correction of gender information. 29 
Not unlike Korea, Germany did not permit the gender 
correction of transsexuals until the German Federal Constitutional 
Court’s decision in 1978.30  Unlike Korea, though, Germany enacted a 
statute called the Transsexuals Act in 1980.31  This legislation regulates the 
pre-conditions and effects of gender change in detail.  For instance,  the 
German legislation requires that an applicant for gender change be 
unmarried.32  If the applicant is married, then (s)he should get a divorce 
before the gender change is approved.33  Whether the applicant has any 
child in or out of wedlock is not relevant to the review process.34  This is 
because the legal effects of gender reassignment are not retroactive in 
nature.35  As a result, it does not affect or alter legal relations surrounding 
the transsexual’s child).36  Once the court approves gender change, the 
                                                                                                               
 28 Id. 
 29 Id. 
 30 BVERFGE, 1 BvR 16/72, Oct. 11, 1978. FCC held here that, seen from recognized 
fundamental rights pertaining to human dignity and freedom of expression, if the petitioner 
exhibited the symptoms of medically irreversible transsexualism and has consequently 
undergone sex change surgeries, the gender on his birth certificate should be accordingly 
modified. If such surgeries were medically proper, then the modification would not be 
contrary to public policy. It was noted that, in the absence of specific statutory grounds, FCC 
still owes a constitutional obligation to correct gender information on the petitioner’s birth 
certificate. 
 31  The official German title of this enactment is Gesetz über die Änderung der Vornamen 
und die Feststellung der Geschlechtszugehörigkeit in besonderen Fällen. 
 32 See Gesetz über die Änderung der Vornamen und die Feststellung 
der Geschlechtszugehörigkeit in besonderen Fällen [Transsexuellengesetz].  
[German Transsexuals Act] (promulgated on Sept. 10, 1980, effective on Jan. 1, 1981), art. 
8.1.2, Bundesgesetzblatt Teil 1 at 56, 1656. 
 33  Rainer Frank, Europe, Teughi Dok-il-eseo Seongbyeol-ui Byeongyeong (유럽, 특히 
독일에서 성별의 변경) [Gender Change in Europe, Particularly in the Context of Germany], 
1 SEOUL DAEHAKGYO BEOBHAK (서울대학교 法學) [SEOUL L.J.] 283, 291 (Kim Jae Hyung 
trans., 2006). This piece was presented at a comparative law conference organized by the 
Korean Supreme Court in September 2005, before the handing down of 2004Su42. 
 34  Frank, supra note 33, at 291. 
 35 Id. 
 36 See Gesetz über die Änderung der Vornamen und die Feststellung 
der Geschlechtszugehörigkeit in besonderen Fällen [Transsexuellengesetz].  
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rights and obligations of the applicant transsexual are determined in 
accordance with the reassigned gender.37 
Korea has yet to have a similar enactment. It is therefore 
unclear under what conditions an application for gender change can 
be approved in the context of family register.  It is speculated that 
since Korea currently prohibits same-sex marriage, the applicant 
should get a divorce before his or her application is granted.  Whether 
the applicant has a minor child may be a factor in the review process; 
such fact, however, need not be an absolute bar to the application.  In 
Korea, all these issues are being formulated and addressed through 
court precedents, as opposed to enactment. 
C. Judicial Influences on the Legislature: a Court Holding 
Prompting Enactment of a Statute  
The Korean Supreme Court decision of 2009Da17417 was a 
highly controversial case involving the suspension of life support for 
an old woman named Madame Kim.38  The plaintiff Kim fell into a 
persistent vegetative state while treated at a hospital run by the 
defendant (Yonsei University).  Medical tests on the plaintiff revealed 
that her brain was in a serious state of shrinkage.  The plaintiff’s 
attending doctor gave the opinion that while she was incapable of 
voluntary control of breathing, the plaintiff was yet to be braindead 
with less than five chance of regaining consciousness.  But other 
specialists who had examined her medical records noted that the 
plaintiff was in an ongoing state of coma and as good as braindead 
with little chances of recovery. 
The plaintiff, a devout Christian, was dependent on a ventilator 
for survival.  While she was healthy and conscious, the plaintiff 
expressed her desire not to burden anyone for protracted medical care 
or assistance to her.  She also expressed her wish not to depend on 
life support in a fatal medical emergency. 
The plaintiff requested that the defendant stop further life-
prolonging treatment.  The Court accepted that request. The 
                                                                                                               
[German Transsexuals Act] (promulgated on Sept. 10, 1980, effective on Jan. 1, 1981), art. 
11, Bundesgesetzblatt Teil 1 at 56, 1656. 
 37 See Gesetz über die Änderung der Vornamen und die Feststellung 
der Geschlechtszugehörigkeit in besonderen Fällen [Transsexuellengesetz]. 
[German Transsexuals Act] (promulgated on Sept. 10, 1980, effective on Jan. 1, 1981), art. 
10, Bundesgesetzblatt Teil 1 at 56, 1656. 
 38 Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2009Da17417, May. 21, 2009 (S. Kor.). 
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2009Da17417 court noted that while recognizing a patient’s right to 
self-determination in the context of life-prolonging treatment, one’s 
right to life is precious and is quintessential to all fundamental 
rights.39  As such, whether to stop any medical treatment that bears 
on a patient’s life requires an extremely cautious decision.  The Court 
was divided on what constitutes the threshold for allowing life-
prolonging treatment to be suspended.40  According to the majority, 
the threshold is met where: (i) the patient has reached the irreparable 
phase of death; and (ii) the patient has previously communicated his 
or her intent that life-prolonging treatment be suspended.41 
In relation to the first element, the irreparable phase of death 
is reached when there is no likelihood for the patient to regain 
consciousness and to recover the loss of vital signs; it must be clear 
that the patient may die within a short period without life support.42  
In relation to the second element, if the patient had expressly 
communicated his or her intent that life-prolonging treatment be 
suspended when reaching the irreparable phase of death, such 
communicated intent would be honored and followed through.43  The 
problem arises when there is no such patient communication.  In that 
instance, according to the majority, the patient’s consent may be 
presumed when it becomes objectively apparent that suspending life-
prolonging treatment would be in the patient’s best interests.44  In this 
regard, what is critical is if, in light of the patient’s usual values and 
belief system while conscious, the patient would have consented to 
the suspension of life-prolonging treatment, had (s)he been given a 
chance to provide informed consent.  Making such a presumption on 
behalf of the patient would not be contrary to common sense nor to 
social norms.45 
If there is any evidence pointing to a terminally-ill patient’s 
intent, be it express or implied, to refuse or stop life-prolonging 
                                                                                                               
 39 Id. Article 10 of the Korean Constitution guarantees all citizens’ human worth and 
dignity. HUNBEOB [CONSTITUTION] art. 10 (S. Kor.). One’s right to life is arguably derived 
from this constitutional provision. See Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2000Da37524, 37530, Jan. 
22, 2002 (S. Kor.). 
 40 Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2009Da17417, May. 21, 2009 (S. Kor.). 
 41 Id. 
 42 Id. 
 43 Id. 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. 
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treatment, the court may order the treatment to be suspended.46  In the 
absence of leading evidence, the minority noted, suspension of 
medical treatment may still be justified from the standpoint of legal 
order in general.47  For instance, the medical institution responsible 
for the patient’s treatment may be obliged to suspend further life-
prolonging treatment as part of its implied obligations under the 
underlying treatment contract. 
In relation to whether suspension of life-prolonging treatment 
is permitted, there was no applicable legislation at the time of this 
case.  Despite this status quo, the Court answered in the affirmative 
by putting certain legal theories to use.  As noted above, the 
2009Da17417 court drew the conclusion that life-prolonging 
treatment may be suspended in accordance with the patient’s right to 
self-determination.  In the process, the Court also applied civil law 
theories relating to interpretation of juristic acts or of expressions in 
formulating the pre-requisites for suspension of treatment.  Following 
2009Da17417, the legislature has recently enacted a statute on life-
prolonging treatment.48  This can be considered an instance where the 
judiciary nudged the legislature into action. 
D. Complimentary Relations between the Legislative and Judiciary 
What was the main issue in 2008Da45828, another en banc 
Court judgement, was a matter of interpretation involving who should 
be party to a bank deposit contract under Korea’s real-name financial 
system. 49   On February 13, 2006, the plaintiff’s husband (“A”) 
opened a new fixed term account (“Account”) with a commercial 
bank (“B”) on the plaintiff’s behalf. A deposited KRW 42 million to 
the Account.  On the application for the Account, both the plaintiff’s 
name and resident number were entered, along with a copy of the 
plaintiff’s photo identification.  The bankbook of the Account was 
issued in the plaintiff’s name, and B’s transactional records showed 
the plaintiff as the owner of the Account. 
                                                                                                               
 46 Id. 
 47 Id. 
 48 Hoseupiseu Wanhwauilyomit Imjong-gwajeong-e Itneun Hwanjaui Yeonmyeong-
uilyo Gyeoljeong-e Gwanhan Beoblyul [Act on Decisions on Hospice and Palliative Care 
and Decisions on Life-sustaining Treatment for Patients at the End of Life], Act No. 15542, 
Mar. 27, 2018 (S. Kor.). 
 49 Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2008Da45828, Mar. 19, 2009 (S. Kor.). 
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The appellate court found an implied agreement between A 
and B that A, as opposed to the plaintiff, was party to the underlying 
deposit contract.  The Court, on the other hand, vacated this finding.50  
In so holding, the Court made it clear that, under the real name 
financial system, where a bank deposit contract is duly entered into 
after real name verification of the account holder, only the account 
holder is entitled to withdraw the fund deposited.  This is the case 
unless there is an unusual circumstance indicating the meeting of 
minds both the bank and the actual depositor of fund intended the 
depositor, rather than the account holder, to be party to the banking 
contract. This ratio was on point and in the right direction.51 
Who is party to a bank deposit contract is a matter of contract 
interpretation.  Especially in the context of rather voluminous and 
repetitive financial transactions such as banking contracts, it becomes 
necessary to determine who is party to such a contract in a relatively 
routine and effortless manner.  In this regard, the determinative 
criterion is who was objectively presented to the bank as the account 
holder after a real name verification process.  This process is in 
conformity with Article 3.1 of the Act on Real Name Financial 
Transactions and Confidentiality (“Real Name Act”).  The provision 
requires financial transactions to proceed on a real-name basis.  What can 
be inferred from this statutory requirement is that only the account holder 
with a verified real name may be party to the underlying transaction and the 
parties’ implied consent to such contract formation.  This mutual assent then 
leads to only the account holder constituting a legitimate party to the 
banking contract.52 
Korea first introduced a real name financial system in 1993. 
In 1997, the Real Name Act was enacted.  Under the enactment, 
                                                                                                               
 50 2008Da45828 consists of the majority opinion, a separate concurring opinion, and two 
supporting opinions. 
 51 For academic views in support of 2008Da45828, see Oh Young Joon (오영준), Geum-
yungsilmyeongjeha-eseo Yegeumgyeyag-ui Dangsaja Hwagjeong bangbeob [How to determine the 
parties to the deposit agreement under the real-name financial system], 8 SABEOB (사법) 
[JURIS], 265 (2009). See also Sohn Chul Woo (손철우), Geum-yungsilmyeongjewa 
Yegeumju Hwagjeong (금융실명제와 예금주 확정) [Real Name Financial System and 
Determination of the Account Holder], MINSAPANRAEYEONGU (XXXII) (민사판례연구 
(XXXII)) [STU. OF CIV. CASES (XXXII)] 155 (2010). 
 52 Kim Jae Hyung (김재형), GEUM-YUNG-GEOLAEUI DANGSAJA-E GWANHAN PANDANGIJUN 
(금융거래의 당사자에 관한 판단기준) [CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING THE PARTIES TO FINANCIAL 
TRANSACTIONS], MINBEOBRON (III) (민법론 (III)) [CIV. L. THEORIES (III)] 70 (2007). This piece 
was presented at the 55th comparative law seminar hosted by the Korean Supreme Court in 
May 2006. 
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financial transactions ought to proceed on a real name basis.  
Adoption of a real name financial system and subsequent enactment 
of the Real Name Act has affected related court cases.  Before 
2008Da45828, the Court was willing to recognize the scope of 
account holder to include any actual depositor of the fund deposited, 
even if the full name of the account holder differed from that of the 
depositor. 53   But, since 2008Da45828, the Court has drastically 
narrowed this, so that in Korea today, only the account holder is 
considered party to the banking contract, in the absence of very 
special circumstances.  The Court’s jurisprudence has greatly 
contributed to increased transparency of financial transactions in 
general. 
Legislation can affect the contours of jurisprudence; yet the 
practical extent of such influence is largely up to the courts to fathom 
and apply.  The enactment of the Real Name Act did not provide 
concrete guidelines for determining who is party to a banking contract.  
It was up to the judiciary and legal academics to deliberate on and 
produce germane guidelines.  In this case, the Court succeed in 
resolving what remained an outstanding issue under the Act based on 
its scrutiny of how the Act defines the parties to a bank deposit 
contract.  2008Da45828 thus illustrates how the legislature and 
judiciary complement each other in practice. 
E. The Impacts of Case Law on Social Changes 
2015Da200111 is a recent landmark Korean Court case.54  It 
has generated prompt and fiery reactions from the Korean legal 
community and society at large.  In this case, the plaintiff paid out 
KRW55 100,000,000 as a success fee to his lawyer according to an 
attorney contingency fee agreement in a related criminal case.  The 
plaintiff subsequently sued the lawyer to return the fee.  The case 
below found that 40 percent of the success fee (that is,  KRW 40 
million) was out of proportion contrary to the principle of good faith 
and trust or of equity and hence null.  As such, the defendant was 
obligated to return KRW 40 million to the plaintiff.  While dismissing 
                                                                                                               
 53 See, e.g., Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 99Da67031, Mar. 10, 2000 (S. Kor.). The author 
called for changes to the existing line of case law. See Kim, supra note 52, at 73–77, 88. 
 54 Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2015Da200111, July 23, 2015 (S. Kor.). 
  55 KRW refers to South Korean won (1 USD = approximately 1,130 KRW at the time 
of writing). 
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the defendant’s appeal, the Court unanimously found that: (i) 
contingency fee agreements in criminal cases are considered contrary to 
the standard of good morals and public order as encapsulated in Article 
103 of the Civil Code; (ii) this finding applies to contingency fees for 
criminal cases going forward; any such fee arrangements predating the 
current judgement may not be deemed null per se; and (iii) the contingency 
fee plan in this case predates the Court’s opinion; as such, it cannot be 
readily adjudged that the plan is null ab initio as contrary to Article 103.  
But, the decision of the case below that 40 percent of the success fee is 
excessive and hence void was upheld. 
a. Are contingency fees in criminal cases against public policy 
and therefore void? 
2015Da200111 is a highly meaningful precedent in light of 
its declaration that contingency fees for criminal cases are null as 
contravening social order and that this ratio is only effective going 
forward and not retroactively.  An attorney’s contingency fee regime 
in a criminal case refers to a financial arrangement whereby the client 
agrees to pay special fees to the attorney depending on the outcome 
of the case or on an agreed rate of success.  The issue here is whether 
to acknowledge the fee regime’s legal effects under freedom of 
contract or deny them as contrary to public policy or the overarching 
principle of good faith and trust. 
Academics have exhibited a whole spectrum of opinions 
ranging from the view that the contingency fee arrangement is valid 
as an extension of freedom of contract to the assertion that 
contingency fees in criminal cases are generally void.  The Court 
previously upheld in principle the validity of contingency fee 
schemes in criminal cases, subject to the caveat that the adjudicating 
court may only uphold a portion of the success fee by applying the 
principle of good faith and equity.56  2015Da200111 reversed the 
prior jurisprudence by holding the illegality of criminal contingency 
fees on public policy grounds.  In so doing, the Court considered 
whether such fee schemes are against the general morals of Korean 
society or pose a risk to the public’s trust in the criminal justice 
system as a whole. 
                                                                                                               
 56 See, e.g., Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2009Da21249, July 9, 2009 (S. Kor.). 
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Whether the Court’s conclusion in 2015Da200111 is 
justifiable remains controversial.  Lawyers and members of the 
general public may well react differently.  Nevertheless, this decision 
is certainly not beyond the normative ambits of the Korean civil law 
system.  The civil law of Korea is largely based on the principle of 
freedom of contract.  Members of the public are thus free to engage 
in civil and commercial activities of their own formulation.  Under 
Article 103 of the Civil Code, however, a juristic act that is contrary 
to social order may be rendered null.  Also, the principle of good faith 
and trust, as encapsulated in Article 2 of the Civil Code, is at work to 
ensure that the outcome of a given case conforms to the norms of 
equity.  Prior jurisprudence of the Court attempted to address the open 
issue of criminal contingency fee agreements by envisaging the 
possibility of reducing success fees based on the principle of good 
faith and trust.  The 2015Da200111 court, by contrast, nullified the 
contingency fee scheme as contrary to Article 103.  It is hence clear 
that both judicial approaches to the same issue are anchored on 
doctrinal tenets of the civil law. 
b. Did the Court err in acknowledging only the prospective 
effect of changes in precedents? 
2015Da200111 denied the retroactive effect of changes in 
case law.  Namely, the Court considered it difficult to nullify existing 
contingency fee schemes under Article 103 of the Civil Code.  The 
controversy in 2015Da200111 could be addressed by reference to the 
existing jurisprudence.  Yet the Court took the further step of 
overturning its own prior jurisprudence to signal the firm policy-
driven resolve that changes to the criminal contingency fee scheme 
and related practices were in order. 
c. Post script 
As can be imagined, criminal defense attorneys have 
vehemently opposed 2015Da200111.  They have argued that any 
flaw with the contingency fee system should be resolved through 
legislation, rather than any judicial pronouncement.  This argument 
is not without merit in that there is no statute or statutory provision 
expressly dealing with the subject of contingency fees for criminal 
cases.  Despite this legislative vacuum, the 2015Da200111 court 
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chose to make proactive use of Article 103 of the Civil Code, a 
statutory provision of general application, to declare that criminal 
contingency fee agreements are void as against public order.57  This, 
in my opinion, exemplifies judicial activism. 58   In fact, 
2015Da200111 is one of the handful of Court cases from the last 
decade evincing judicial activism.  The relative scarcity of these cases 
makes them highly influential in shaping the judicial landscape of 
Korea.  Needless to say, judicial activism is neither an unswerving 
principle nor a path to tread all the time.  At the end of the day, what 
policy stance a court is to assume in a given case would be as 
important as the doctrinal issues underpinning that case. 
Ⅳ. CONCLUSION 
One of the Court’s primary roles is to provide uniform points 
of reference for interpreting various statutes.  Such role is reified 
differently in different cases.  While pursuing legal certainty, the 
Court also attempts to achieve case-specific correctness in sync with 
the ideals of justice.  In this process, the legislature and judiciary may 
be in complementary or strained relations with one another, 
depending on the context. 
The legislature and judiciary may not claim absolute 
supremacy over the other.  Rather, they are like two wheels of a cart 
in pursuit of the common objective called justice.  This symbiotic 
relationship is expected to go a long way in cultivating a healthy state 
and society at large. 
Social changes will invariably entail new sets of problems.  
Legislation may not be a panacea here.  In order for the Court to 
assume a visionary role in this milieu, it must be equipped with 
precise understandings of the Constitution and other laws of the land 
to provide timely, reasonable and often creative legal solutions.  
Relying on the individual judges’ sense of equity or justice will be 
only a part of the equation.  The Court’s precedents will lack 
persuasiveness and coherence without adequate theological 
                                                                                                               
 57 Id. 
 58 In support of the majority, the supporting opinion in 2015Da20011 put forward legal maxims 
relating to trust in the judicial system, the public’s legal consciousness, comparative law materials, and 
positive future effects of the Court’s enunciation in this case. These suggested elements are highly 
unconventional in the Korean judicial system and forward-looking, which, in my opinion, are 
reminiscent of judicial activism. 
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underpinnings.  In its ongoing quest for such legal acumen, the 
Korean Supreme Court has greatly benefitted not only from soul 
searching inside, but also from comparative studies of the noteworthy 
experiences of other jurisdictions.  I have no doubt that this 
conference will provide a useful forum for hearing what each 
attendant representing the highest court in each participating 
jurisdiction, has to offer during the course of this forum and in the 
future.  Thank you. 
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